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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
Risk, Ends, and Means
Commander Alan Lee Boyer, U.S. Navy

L

ocated in the heart of Central Asia are five weak states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Structural factors such as small
populations and geographic remoteness, combined with a failure to provide ade1
quate levels of “political goods,” are the sources of their weakness. The governments’ failures are due in large part to the political and economic development
paths they have followed since independence at the breakup of the Soviet Union in
1991. The governments in Central Asia are largely authoritarian and ruled by former Communist Party officials. The ruling elites of each Central Asian state have
gradually consolidated power into their own hands, by repressing political opponents, free speech, and the media, and by funneling the proceeds of their states’
economies to their personal benefit or that of the apparatuses that keep them in
power. As a result, political institutions are generally very weak, corruption and
2
“rent seeking” are rampant, and economic management is poor. The ability of
citizens to effect peaceful change is very limited, and economic benefits typically
do not trickle down. In summary, the governments of Central Asia have failed to
3
provide for the needs of their people and are sowing the seeds of unrest.
The general political and economic weakness of all five countries makes them
candidates for state failure and conflict. With state
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failure comes increased criminal activity, corruption,
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poverty, civil strife, radicalism (of which terrorism is
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4
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tal devastation. As a scholar has reminded us, failed
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states like Afghanistan and “their associated problems
simply do not go away. They linger, and they generally
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get worse.” The negative side effects of state failure can and do easily spread in
6
today’s rapidly globalizing world and thereby impact U.S. interests. The possibility that one or more Central Asian states could fail and become havens for terrorists, international criminal activity, and other sources of instability is a
matter of concern not just for Russia, Pakistan, and China but for the United
7
States and the West generally.
Central Asia’s strategic importance is based on three factors: location, human
rights, and energy. The first factor, location, is important because of who lies
upon the borders. The second factor, human rights, is a major U.S. national interest and an objective of the George W. Bush administration’s foreign policy.8
The last factor, energy, is important not because Central Asian oil will free the
West from dependence on OPEC oil but because of its impact on corruption and
other indicators of state failure.
Central Asia presents several formidable challenges to American policy makers.
Foremost among them is the ability of the United States to effect positive change
and reform in the region’s governance and economic conditions. Progress to date
has been limited. The primary reasons have been the nature of the regimes in power,
regional geopolitics, resources devoted, and misalignment of ends and means on
the part of the United States. Additional factors include the remoteness of the Central Asian states and a general lack of coordination among the many governments,
international organizations (IOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
that are providing assistance. The significance of all these factors and weaknesses is
that there is little likelihood that the United States or the West as a whole will be able
to stimulate representative governments, free markets, adherence to human rights,
9
etc., in Central Asia in the short or medium term. The only real opportunity to effect major change in the next ten to fifteen years will arise when the current leaderships change. If it is to take advantage of this opportunity, the United States (and the
West generally) should pursue two courses of action: first, focus on long-term
objectives and advance agendas that will set the stage for the eventual rise of new
leadership favorable to Western goals and objectives; and second, avoid piecemeal
and uncoordinated projects that do not offer rewards for broadly based, sweeping
10
reforms. Such a strategy is not risk free, but neither is the current U.S. approach.
The goal of this article is to provide analysis and policy recommendations
that could reduce American strategic risk. Strategic risk can be lowered only if
the mismatches between ends and means are reduced and strategy is made subservient to policy.
WHY THE WEST AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CARE
The most pressing source of Central Asia’s strategic importance is the fact that it
borders Russia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan, and is near Pakistan and India. It

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss1/6

2

Boyer: U.S. Foreign Policy in Central Asia
BOYER

60

93

80

Russia

Kazakhstan

Georgia
Armenia

Uzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan

China

Tajikistan

Azerbaijan

Afghanistan
Iraq

Iran

India
Pakistan

is in the U.S. interest that the neighbors of China, Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan
11
be peaceful, prosperous, and strong. The possibility that one or more Central
Asian states could fail and become sources of regional instability and transnational threats is very real. Weak states, especially anocracies (that is, states that
are neither clearly democratic nor authoritarian), are inherently unstable and
12
highly susceptible to failure. The region’s two autocracies, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan, seem now to be politically stable, but their stability is not likely to be
sustainable over the long run. The May 2005 riots in Uzbekistan and the political
unrest that brought down the Askar Akaev presidency in Kyrgyzstan are recent
examples of the kinds of instability that could lead to state failure.
Misrule and economic mismanagement have allowed radicalism and corruption to take root in Central Asia, which over the long term are likely to become
severe impediments to regional development and security. In Central Asia “dire
poverty—combined with despair and outrage over rampant corruption, repressive policies, and governments’ failure to address local needs—could lead to outbreaks of localized unrest with the potential to spread into a wider regional
13
conflict.” None of the states that surround Central Asia, least of all Russia or
Afghanistan, can afford to have failed states on their borders. The frontiers of
Central Asian states are very porous, and there is no reason to believe that such
unstable elements as terrorists, criminal organizations, drugs, etc., will not cross
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them. The international community has already seen the impact of state failure
in Afghanistan—a million dislocated people, refugees, terrorist training camps,
14
and human rights abuses. Should a Central Asia state fail, Russia or another regional power will likely intervene to restore order.
The second U.S. interest in the region is human rights, which lie at the core of
American values and beliefs and have traditionally been a major national interest. As President Bush has stated on numerous occasions, the United States be15
lieves strongly in human rights and the dignity of all people. Not only do
Americans believe that supporting human rights is morally the right thing to do,
but doing so also benefits American national security in today’s globalized
16
world. Congressionally mandated programs like the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and newer initiatives like the
Millennium Challenge Account are examples of how the United States uses for17
eign policy to advance the national interest of human rights. Therefore it is
likely that the U.S. government will continue to concern itself with abuses of human rights in Central Asia.
The last reason why the United States should pay attention to what occurs in
Central Asia is energy. Many, like Vice President Dick Cheney and former secretary of energy Spencer Abraham, see Central Asia as a region where the West can
access non-OPEC-controlled energy. Energy underpins the global economy;
therefore economic growth and prosperity are tied to energy security: “Our en18
ergy security is linked directly to the energy supplies of our trading partners.”
When the United States talks about energy in the Central Asian context it means
oil in Kazakhstan, especially the Kashagan oil field, and natural gas in
19
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
However, the ability of the three energy-rich states to extract and export oil
and gas has been limited by underdevelopment, aging infrastructure, and the
cost of transport to markets. The region’s remoteness and geopolitics are also serious impediments to the export of gas and oil. If Central Asia is to become a significant energy exporter, it will need substantial investment in its energy
20
infrastructure, investment that can only come from abroad. Chinese national
oil companies have already spent $1.3 billion on oil infrastructure and promised
in November 2004 to spend another $9.5 billion on pipelines and oil fields in or21
der to transport oil from Kazakhstan to China. The Kashagan oil field, it is estimated, will cost twenty-nine billion dollars to develop (Kazakhstan’s gross
22
domestic product in 2003 was only $29.7 billion). In general, tens of billions of
dollars of foreign direct investment (FDI) are required to develop fully the region’s energy reserves, a fact that makes energy from Central Asia much more
costly than that from the Middle East and elsewhere.
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Additionally, according to the Energy Information Agency (a branch of the
U.S. Department of Energy), Caspian Sea (that is, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan, as well as parts of Russia and Iran) “production levels, even at
their peak, will pale in comparison to OPEC countries’ production levels. Production levels are expected to reach 4 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2015,
23
compared to 45 million bbl/d for the OPEC countries in that year.” This means
that oil from Central Asia will not only cost more but be exhausted sooner and in
the meantime will be able to provide the West only a small percentage of the energy it requires. Central Asia will not be able to free the West from its reliance on
OPEC oil. The real importance of the region’s energy reserves is in their impact
on corruption and other indicators that lead to state weakness and possible state
failure.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all rely heavily on a
few nonrenewable resources—oil, natural gas, and gold (see table 1). This de24
pendence makes them vulnerable to the “resource curse,” or “resource trap.”
Natural resources can become a burden if their net effect is to reduce economic
growth, increase the likelihood of civil war or authoritarian rule, or impede the
25
development of democracy. Specific economic aspects of the “resource curse”
include an increase in a country’s real exchange rate due to a large influx of foreign currency, which results, in turn, in “Dutch disease,” low employment opportunities and inability to absorb laid-off workers from other sectors due to the
capital- vice labor-intensive nature of the gas and oil industries; a rise in sub26
sidies and corruption; and increased foreign debt. Central Asian governments
can avoid these outcomes if they improve the accountability, transparency, and
27
public oversight of the development of their resources. Unfortunately, however, the indications are that they are already suffering from the effects of the resource curse. Specifically, the repression effect is apparent in all of them, as are
high levels of corruption and lack of transparency and accountability in the
28
management and use of the profits earned from their natural resources.
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
Can Central Asian states change and develop into strong states? The short answer is, not soon. Of course, anything is possible, and it can be argued that things
are improving, at least economically. However, the conditions required to drive
the fundamentally needed reforms are absent. The main reason is the nature of
the regimes. All five states, with the possible exception of Kyrgyzstan since
March 2005, and the political elites that support them, generally resist change
that does not reinforce their hold on power.29 External pressures that run counter to this aim are also resisted. As has been observed, “These governments
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TABLE 1
2003 ECONOMIC DATA
Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

GDP U.S.$ billions

29.7

1.9

1.4

Turkmenistan

Natural resources

Energy (gas,
oil), uranium
(1/4 of world)

Gold, other
minerals

Aluminum
processing and
cotton

Energy (gas)

6.2

Uzbekistan
9.9
Cotton (12% of
world 2001/02),
gold, energy (gas)

Agriculture as % of
GDP in 2003

7.8

38.7

23.4

19.7

35.2

Imports as % GDP

30.8

43.2

63.0

40.7

25.8

Exports as % GDP

45.6

39.2

57.0

58.9

31.0

Exports U.S.$ millions

12,900

745

798

3,465

3,065

Imports U.S.$ millions

8,300

821

881.3

2,521

2,554

Fuel & oil products %
of total export trade

59.8

0

0

30.4

0

Products as % of total
export trade 2003

Base metals
11.6%

Gold 44.1%

Aluminum 49%,
electricity 23%,
cotton 12%

Natural gas 54%
cotton 3%

Gold 34.7%, cotton 28.8% (4thlargest producer
in world)

Source: All data either from World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004, available at www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/; “World Bank Country at a
Glance” data sheets available at web.worldbank.org/; U.S. State Department Country data sheets available at www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/.

constantly seek to evade foreign relations that entangle them in a perceived web
30
of dependency that prevents the unbridled exercise of powers at home.” This is
one of the main reasons why efforts to foster regional cooperation have largely
been ineffective. All of these governments are highly suspicious of outside institutions and organizations. They see the domestic political climate as more anarchic than that of the external world; therefore, they strive to prevent outside
actors and factors from stimulating internal forces that could weaken their con31
trol or diffuse their power. This political atmosphere has resulted in a decadelong process of the consolidation of economic and political power in the hands
of small ruling elites. Whether this will continue to be the norm in Kyrgyzstan is
hard to tell, but since the new leadership largely comprises members of the former regime, this is not out of the question.
The net result of all this has been a weakening of democracy and the rule of
law in general. Institutions like the judiciary and legislative branches of government are extremely weak and have very limited ability to effect change; therefore
it will be very difficult to alter the current distribution of power via elections and
democratic processes. The leadership in the region has in effect created a situation where the ability of the states to meet their obligations to their citizens is
very limited, if not absent. This in turn has produced economic stagnation (except in Kazakhstan), human rights violations, pervasive corruption, high levels
of poverty, and a further weakening of social and political institutions. These
trends have contributed to a gradual erosion of the legitimacy of Central Asian
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governments in the eyes of their citizens. Once a government loses its legitimacy,
as happened in Kyrgyzstan, violence erupts and leaders fall.
From this we can draw three conclusions about the prospects in Central Asia.
First, governance is not likely to improve significantly on its own. Second, real
political reform will require a change in leadership and governing institutions.
Regime change will probably not happen on its own through normal political
processes, such as elections; some other significant event will be needed to cata32
lyze change. Aside from a major revolt from within or invasion from without,
the best opportunity will arise when the current presidents move on. The presidents of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan are all in their mid-sixties;
their deaths or departures from office for reasons of health are probably not far
off. Reformers may not replace them, but the transitions will present opportunities for a fresh start. Central Asian states do not have the strong institutions and
civil societies needed to manage the peaceful transfer of power. It is quite possible that an internal power struggle could result in unrest, even chaos, or, just as
easily, elevate a member of the former president’s immediate family or clan who
would continue where his predecessor left off.
Short of regime change, change will be slow and uneven through the medium
term. Over the long term, the general weakness of Central Asian states will make
their peoples susceptible to a host of negative forces. Globalization, as it gradually
encroaches, will lend greater impact to outside sources of conflict and instability like
radicalism (terrorism and Islamism) and criminal activity. The criminalization of
Central Asian society is likely to continue, then, as a result of poor governance, corruption, and a growing nexus between criminal elements (drug traffickers, smug33
glers, etc.) and political elites. Unless these trends are reversed, Central Asia’s
future will be one of continued state weakness and growing possibility of failure.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Central Asia presents many challenges for American policy makers. The most
severe is that the United States will continue to find it difficult to influence the
regimes and people of the region.
Limits on American Influence
American influence there has increased over the last several years, but it is still
very limited.34 Four factors limit U.S. influence: geopolitics, regime characteristics, history and culture, and structural issues.
Regional Geopolitics. The Central Asian states and their neighbors are largely
authoritarian. In such a neighborhood, democracy, human rights, and other
Western concerns do not dominate the agenda. The regional powers (Russia,
China, and Iran) are concerned about their influence over their weaker
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neighbors. They, especially Russia, desire regimes that are stable but follow their
lead, politically and economically. No action the United States might take can be
viewed in isolation; Washington must weigh the impact of any decision on the
regional powers.
Russia and China often see the United States as an outsider intruding on their
spheres of influence. President Vladimir Putin and numerous Russian officials
have expressed concern at U.S. presence in the region. In 2004, Putin suggested
that Russia, China, and India should work together economically and politically
35
to counterbalance U.S. hegemony. Essentially, he was advocating a new axis, or
“strategic triangle,” to offset Russia’s own weaknesses. Greater American and
other Western involvement in the region is likely to be resisted by the regional
powers and to fuel competition, not inspire cooperation.
A further geopolitical issue is the general failure of the regional cooperation
needed to solve many of Central Asia’s most pressing issues, especially economic
development and poverty, drug trafficking, transregional criminal activity, water and border disputes, and terrorism. Regional cooperation has improved
somewhat over the last few years, but it still continues to be weak and ineffective.
Most of the improvement has been in antiterrorism. Overall regional coopera36
tion can be expected to remain weak as long as current regimes are in power.
Unless Central Asian states can create a common security and economic identity, intraregional cooperation will likely suffer.
Afghanistan is another geopolitical factor. As long as Afghanistan remains
unstable and weak, its problems will continue to reduce Central Asian stability.
Further, Afghanistan impacts American ability to influence Central Asia in two
ways. First, it tends to dominate attention and allocation of resources in the region; time and money spent on Afghanistan means less of either for Central
37
Asia. Secondly, Afghanistan serves as a haven for and source of radicalism and
criminal activity. The drug trade undermines governance in poor states like
Tajikistan, which worsens corruption—administrators are poorly paid, judges
and border guards easily corrupted, etc. The institutions of Central Asia are not
well equipped to deal with the forces emerging from Afghanistan.
The Nature of the Regimes. As we have seen, the regimes that control Central
Asian governments are not inclined to change or reform, and if they do not want
to change, it is very difficult for the American government to make them. Even
U.S. bases and seeming agreement on terrorism have not increased American influence. Central Asian regimes do not see terrorism as the United States does but
as a factor through which they can use the United States against each other and
to legitimize the suppression of domestic political opponents. This is especially
true in Uzbekistan and, to a lesser degree, in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
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A good example occurred in Uzbekistan on 13 May 2005, when President Islam
Karimov used deadly force to crack down on a protest by relatives of twentythree jailed businessmen. He justified his actions by calling the protestors Is38
lamic extremists and terrorists. Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states have
legitimate concerns about terrorism, especially the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), but not to that extent—in any case, the United States destroyed the bulk of the IMU in Afghanistan in 2002.
For the United States, this means that influence must be exercised in subtle
and indirect ways. Washington has many such ways and does try to use them, but
so far it has achieved only limited results. American “soft power” and support of
39
international and nongovernmental organizations are two of its better tools.
As countries become more integrated into globalization, international and
nongovernmental organizations have greater opportunities to influence foreign
audiences. Unfortunately, many of the positive aspects of globalization do not
penetrate Central Asian society to any great extent. The lack of Internet access or
truly free media, low levels of development, and high poverty rates inhibit the
effectiveness of American soft power. NGOs and IOs are very active in the region
40
but have been unable to get much done. NGOs are largely foreign funded, have
41
a limited base outside big cities, and are often suppressed by local governments.
These factors severely hamper their ability to foster a vibrant civil society.
Cultural Norms and Historical Legacies. Unlike the societies of Eastern Europe,
those of Central Asia are not predisposed toward liberal modes of governance or
life. The ruling elites have the same mentality they had prior to independence in
1991. Cultural norms like obedience to the clan and local leaders reinforce the
authoritarian nature of their governments. Most people in the region do not have
the cultural basis or experience needed to mature such liberal concepts as federalism, democracy (especially a genuine party system), free trade, or freedom of the
press.42 This does not mean they cannot adopt liberal forms of governance, but it
does mean that liberal institutions and ideas will require time and considerable
effort to take hold. The conservative nature of the power structures in the region
will continue to obstruct Western organizations, institutions, and ideas; therefore,
the ability of Washington to use them as levers for reform will be limited.
Structural Issues. Geography, small and disconnected populations and economies, poor transportation networks, and weak institutions, combined with a generally hostile investment climate (pervasive corruption, weak rule of law, and
ineffective economic structures), make it very hard for one of the West’s best tools,
capitalism, to penetrate. Access to the world’s markets would likely lead to more
and deeper interaction; given greater economic interaction, other Western norms
might penetrate that could improve governance and the overall quality of life.
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However, the region’s remoteness and the fragmentation of its markets tend to
discourage investment, outside of the gas and oil sectors. These factors, combined
with the influence of authoritarian neighbors like Russia and China, tend to impede the positive potentials of globalization and to restrict American influence.
Closely related is Central Asia’s human rights record. The U.S. government
and other Western entities have achieved modest success in this area, but human
rights abuses seem to be standard operating procedure, especially in Uzbekistan.
A case in point is that of Ruslan Sharipov, an Uzbek journalist and human rights
activist convicted of what his supporters considered politically motivated and
fabricated charges in August 2003. Torture, sexual assault, and other forms of
43
abuse are common in the Uzbek penal system. The U.S. State Department, the
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Freedom House, and
numerous other organizations continue to document similar problems
throughout Central Asia. External pressure and response to high-profile cases
like Sharipov’s will help individuals, but wholesale change in the region’s poor human rights performance is unlikely any time soon. Until greater internal pressure
for reform is forthcoming, the human rights outlook in Central Asia will be poor.
The final implication for U.S. policy deals with the likelihood of conflict. It is
unlikely that resource competition, drugs, poverty, radicalism, the criminalization of Central Asian society, the return of great-power rivalries, or other
44
such trends will in themselves cause interstate conflict; however, one of them
or a combination could catalyze fighting. The regimes themselves are the key
factor—whether or not conflict occurs depends primarily on their ability to
withstand the discontent and instability that are likely to arise in each state.
Should one or more of these five states fail, conflict is likely to erupt, first within
but then beyond the borders of individual countries.
Means, Ends, and Risks
Gaps between ends and means increase strategic risk. In order to achieve its
long-term goals in Central Asia, U.S. policy needs to reduce risk arising from
mismatches between ends and means. Are the means being employed by the
United States likely to promote the ends it desires in Central Asia? Only time can
definitively answer this question. However, it is possible to make reasonable predictions as to whether American goals can be achieved in Central Asia.
The ultimate goal of American foreign policy in Central Asia is to create stable
states on Russia’s southern flank. Stability from the American perspective is more
than the absence of conflict. It means peaceful and prosperous states that can integrate themselves into today’s globalized world. According to President Bush:
It should be clear that decades of excusing and accommodating tyranny, in the pursuit of stability, have only led to injustice and instability and tragedy. It should be
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clear that the advance of democracy leads to peace, because governments that respect
the rights of their people also respect the rights of their neighbors. It should be clear
that the best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance and hope kindled in
free societies. And our duty is now clear: For the sake of our long-term security, all
free nations must stand with the forces of democracy and justice.45

American policy makers believe this can happen only if the Central Asian
states adopt representative forms of government, embrace the free market, respect the rule of law, protect human rights, and allow freedom of the press, religion, and other personal freedoms. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage declared on 27 April 2004 that the “region is a lynchpin in global peace
and prosperity” and that therefore stability in Central Asia “is of paramount importance and of vital national interest to our nation.” The key to regional stability, he stated, is “to have successful and fully independent states, which, in the
46
long term, will depend on open economies and representative governments.”
American foreign policy and strategy, then, in their broadest sense, are primarily
about producing states that can deliver political goods adequately to their citizens—because such states will be reliable trading partners, respect human
rights, and refuse to become havens for transnational threats like terrorism. This
logic and strategy are sound; states that effectively deliver political goods to their
citizens are less likely than others to weaken or fail, lessening potential security
threats to American and Western interests.
In order to achieve this broader stability in Central Asia, American policy makers need to unify the elements of national power—diplomatic, military, economic, informational, and cultural—in a comprehensive strategy. Each element
needs to reinforce the others, and short-term objectives should undermine
long-term ends as little as possible. Recent U.S. Central Asian policy has not
achieved this synergy or consistency. To many, it has seemed overshadowed by
47
short-term military requirements and objectives. The establishment of military
bases and the signing of the United States–Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework increased security-related assistance
(especially in 2002), and the American focus on terrorism moved security and
military concerns to the forefront of the U.S. agenda in the region. In many ways,
these actions were necessary correlatives to the war in Afghanistan; increased U.S.
military presence in the region has had the benefit of increasing American influence, and some argue that American military presence in itself will likely generate
48
positive results. However, the recent focus on traditional security concerns may
undermine long-term U.S. strategy and fail to create the level of stability needed.
The reason can be found in the political realities on the ground. For the regimes and the elites who support them, the point is to stay in charge, to maintain
their hold on power. The war on terrorism furthers these goals; exaggerating the
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terrorist threat justifies repressive measures and diverts attention from internal
problems. The United States is still concerned about real reform, but the regimes
see a shift in the American message, away from concern with real reform; they
now see a United States prepared to deal with them on their own terms in return
for military cooperation in the war on terror. The secretary of defense, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Defense officials have reinforced this message. For example, in August 2004 the chairman of the Joint Chiefs criticized a
State Department cutoff of aid to Uzbekistan due to a lack of progress in human
49
rights; the cutoff, he declared, reduced U.S. military influence. The chairman
announced an increase in nonproliferation aid and the transfer of fourteen patrol boats to Uzbekistan. Such mixed signals are dangerous because it allows local leaders to choose the messages they want to hear and ignore other critical
aspects of American policy.
This overemphasis on traditional security measures is the first of the six strategic risks the United States faces in aligning its Central Asian goals with its
means. The key challenge is not to let short-term actions determine policy.
Should this happen, and the current strategy ends up helping Central Asian regimes consolidate their hold on power, we are likely to see an exacerbation of existing tensions and structural problems that could lead to state failure.
A second and closely related risk deals with how the United States categorizes
local terrorist groups. American policy tends to see all terrorists as inherently
evil and as enemies of the West. It does not distinguish between truly transnational groups and those existing largely in response to local conditions. Radicalism in Central Asia, however, is not the same as radicalism in the Middle East
or Afghanistan. Some terrorists, like the IMU, have links to transnational
groups, but Central Asian radicalism is firmly embedded in local realities: lack
of political participation, poverty, poor governance, corruption, and government oppression. Because local governments, especially in Uzbekistan, tend to
classify anyone who opposes them as criminals or terrorists, the United States
could end up being viewed as backing oppressive and corrupt regimes. The populations of the region might turn away from democracy, trade liberalization,
and other U.S. goals and start to see the models of China or Russia as attractive
alternatives to Western-style governance. A second outcome might be a rise in antiAmericanism, as Central Asian youth, unable to express their dissatisfaction with
their governments, turn their anger toward the United States. Such an outcome
would only play into the hands of extremists.
Another risk for the United States and the West generally is that Western ideals
and support may fail to meet the high expectations of local populations. Many understand only poorly the nature of international power relations and the limits on
50
the ability of Western institutions to influence their governments. Combine

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss1/6

12

Boyer: U.S. Foreign Policy in Central Asia
BOYER

103

seeming failure with governments that spout empty words about democracy and
fail to deliver basic political freedoms or reform, and the result could be a discrediting of democracy and Western institutions in the eyes of Central Asians.
A fourth risk factor is a potential lack of resources. If U.S. policy is to succeed,
it must not only be the right strategy but be properly supported by resources. Resources fall into two broad categories: attention of senior decision makers and
funding. Contrary to the hopes of some commentators, Central Asia has not
moved to the center of American foreign policy; it is not even a significant focus.
Senior policy makers from the president on down spend the majority of their
time on the Middle East, Europe, China, Iran, East Asia (Japan and the Koreas),
Pakistan, Mexico, Russia, and whatever the crisis of the moment is.
This is to be expected. As the world’s sole superpower, the United States has
interests everywhere. The attention and focus they demand exceed the capacity
51
of a handful a key decision makers. A distant region like Central Asia is therefore bound to be on the periphery of their concerns—with the result that American Central Asia policy is likely to be captured by other policy agendas and
subjected to gross oversimplification. For this reason American policy in the region is, and will likely continue to be, full of inconsistencies and contradictions.
Greater regional expertise would help but would not totally mitigate this risk.
The second half of the resource problem, funding, directly relates to the first.
Policy makers who misunderstand Central Asia politics and events are not likely
to devote the right resources to the region. Even if they do, resources are always
finite; policy makers have to prioritize. As figure 1 shows, prior to 9/11 Ameri52
can assistance to the region was $242.6 million (fiscal year 2001). In fiscal year
2002, U.S. assistance more than doubled to $582.6 million, in connection with
fighting al-Qa‘ida in Afghanistan. Two years later, the figure had decreased to
$236.7 million, slightly lower than in 2001 (1.14 percent of total foreign assistance, 1.47 percent in 2001).
Apparently, then, the amount of money the United States is willing to spend
on the region is very small, compared to the three billion dollars the United
53
States gives in military aid to Israel and Egypt every year. This is a poor region,
with many needs; this level of funding might not support the desired ends. Also,
if the money available is spent on one tool at the expense of others, the objectives
advanced could overshadow, even negate, the effectiveness of those others.
Further, studies indicate that if aid is to be effective, recipient countries must
54
be moving toward sound policies and institutions. Financial and economic aid
generally does not work well in a bad policy environment; governments that
do a poor job of allocating and delivering services to the public generally do
not use aid effectively. By that measure, any aid or assistance given to a Central
Asian government is liable to be used ineffectively or siphoned off by corrupt
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individuals or agencies.
The risk the United States
runs in providing aid to
700
582.9
the region is that it may
600
fail to reach the intended
500
recipients or generate
400
294.8
needed reform, instead
242.6
300
236.7
supporting oppressive
200
regimes.
100
American bases and
0
increased involvement in
2001
2002
2003
2004
the region could create a
Sources: Jim Nichols, Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, Congressional Issue Brief IB93108 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2003), p. 16, table 1; U.S.
fifth risk, the return of
State Department Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs fact sheets, available at www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/.
great-power rivalry in the
region. As already discussed, Russia and China have over the last couple of years
taken steps to counter U.S. moves. Each sees the United States as an intruder in
its sphere of influence; it is quite possible that American actions in the region
could impede interests more vital to the United States than Central Asia. In any
case, should great-power competition arise in the region and the United States
decide to play, it will have to devote more resources there—resources that may
not be available.
The last risk the United States could face is that its policy may only strengthen
the current regimes’ hold on power, not generate the reform needed to achieve
U.S. objectives. Politically stable governments in the states of the former Soviet
Union, one scholar has found, have generated the least economic reform and democracy, whereas in the least politically stable governments (Poland, Bulgaria,
and three Baltic states), vested interests were not allowed to gain control of the
55
government, and so economic reform and democracy were able to grow. Central Asian states being not inclined to economic and political reform, American
actions that foster the status quo may only inhibit the achievement of U.S. objectives. Political chaos, once it comes, may be all the more risky, because the radicalism built up in the meantime by political repression or economic stagnation
could produce state failure.
FIGURE 1
TOTAL U.S. ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL ASIA (U.S.$ MILLIONS)

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The desired end state of United States and Western policy in Central Asia should
be reformed governments capable of delivering adequate levels of political
goods. Such states will be stable and economically prosperous, have good human rights records, enjoy some form of representative governance, and resist
terrorists, drug traffickers, or other transnational threats. American strategy
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must be balanced with an understanding of the limitations of U.S. influence in
the region. It must better align all instruments of national power to ensure that
each reinforces the others. The departments of State and Defense and other U.S.
agencies must not send mixed messages to the governments and people of Central Asia. The Defense Department should ensure that its security objectives
support overall policy. The State Department needs to be the coordinating point
of all U.S. policy so that the region receives a unified message from Washington.
In addition to a unified American strategy, there needs to be a coordinated Western strategy between the United States, Western aid agencies, international organizations like the OSCE and NATO, and international NGOs.
A second element of this coordinated strategy must be with regional powers.
NGOs, international institutions, and individual Western governments, working singly, have only limited ability to induce change in current Central Asian
governments. However, if they can combine their efforts and develop a common
strategy with the United States and other regional powers, the ability of the international community to influence Central Asian regimes will be dramatically
improved. This should also reduce the ability of regimes to play off one power
against the other; that in turn could lessen great-power competition and dramatically improve the effectiveness of aid and other policy tools. The United
States and regional powers will not agree in all areas, but there are enough areas
of mutual concern to generate cooperation. Areas of common interest include
economic development, border control, poverty alleviation, strengthening of
the institutions of governance, financial reform, development of human capital,
counternarcotics, and transportation infrastructure. By focusing on areas of
common value, all sides will be able to advance their interests in a mutually beneficial manner, with a positive effect on stability. This will also make it much easier
for the United States to convince other powers that it is not trying to dominate
the region. The United States will never be able to eliminate Russian and Chinese
unease, but through careful diplomacy and policy it can reduce suspicion to a
56
level that does not impede cooperation.
A key element of a coordinated regional strategy will be finding a way to increase cooperation between the five Central Asian states, the West, and regional
powers. One avenue would be existing regional organizations, like the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, as mediums for confidence building and cooperation. However, these organizations have generally been ineffective at generating
real cooperation between Central Asian states and have largely been vehicles for
57
regional powers to maintain or increase their influence. A better solution
would be for the United States, OSCE, regional powers, and Central Asian states
to form a new regional multilateral organization focused on building cooperation. The institutions it created would allow for greater interaction and create
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forums where the interests of all involved states could be advanced. A new regional multilateral organization backed by the great powers could produce collaboration in areas where it is currently lacking, such as economic reform,
governance, and border control—which in turn would improve trade, counternarcotics enforcement, and counterterrorism. Likewise, institutions and mechanisms to handle water distribution, especially in areas such as the Kyrgyz
Batken Valley and Tajik Sogd Province, could reduce cross-border conflict over
water rights.
Such an entity might also be able to deal with political instability should one
or more of the regional governments fail. Such a structure could help Central
Asian states peacefully and collectively manage political turmoil in the region.
An independent, multilateral organization would also be a natural forum in
which major powers could confer and pool resources with which to respond to
such a contingency; individual powers would thereby be less likely to take action
on their own.
However, a coordinated regional strategy, though it offers many benefits, will
not totally eliminate the need for bilateral engagement by the United States.
For some areas, such as military assistance, bilateral relations may prove more
effective. The challenge for Washington will be to ensure that the bilateral and
cooperative approaches reinforce each other. If not carefully designed, bilateral
economic and military aid can undermine a coordinated strategy. Effective
management between the bilateral and cooperative means that one agency—the
State Department—will have to coordinate all actions and ensure that the various agencies involved stay focused on the big picture and long-term strategic
objectives. If Central Asian states do not see American policy as united and consistent, they will be able to play off one agency against the other.
The next key element of policy must be a realization that Central Asia states
are all weak states and could fail. Some are less likely to than others, but all have
significant difficulties in delivering political goods to their societies. Weak states
or not, however, they are highly resistant to change. In terms of policy, this
means that reform is likely to be achieved only through political instability—the
best hope for the creation of alternative centers of power and breaking the hold
of entrenched interests. U.S. policy must therefore be ready for, and help lay the
groundwork for, leadership change; as already noted, the best opportunity for
that will occur when the old Soviet-era leadership moves on. When it does, the
transition is likely to be ugly, due to the weakness of political institutions. Therefore, helping create an environment that allows for legitimate alternatives to the
current governments, on one hand, and Islamism, on the other, needs to be a
central element of U.S. strategy.
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Helping create an environment that can weather the storm of regime change
and political instability is a strategy focused on preventing state failure. This
strategy has two elements. The first involves the use of diplomacy and other
means to create political space for civil action. The key here is to find ways to
constrain state violence and repression in order to give nonviolent groups the
opportunity to develop and mature. This may involve targeted sanctions against
the economic interests of government officials and ruling elites or the withholding of military and economic assistance.
The second component of this strategy would be helping societies develop
tools and ways of thinking that will allow them to reform themselves politically,
socially, and economically when given the chance. This component is about creating and investing in the human capital needed to handle the transition from
authoritarianism to democratic rule. Substantial civil societies focused on non58
violence historically have been able to manage this transition. Encouraging
such conditions will require the United States and other donors to invest in and
support student organizations, anticorruption groups, election-monitoring
and voter-education organizations, independent media, political party training
and building, trade unions and worker organizations, women’s groups, and
59
think tanks.
Such strategy carries considerable risk and will be difficult to institute in the
region, especially in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. However, the alternative is
likely to be chaos, violence, and reduced chances that good governance will
emerge from the eventual regime transition. For instance, civic life had not fully
developed in Kyrgyzstan when the government fell in March 2005. As a result,
violence occurred during the ensuing Kyrgyz Tulip Revolution, some of it orga60
nized by criminal elements in the southern part of the country. It is still too
early to tell whether Kyrgyzstan will finally achieve representative rule, but history demonstrates that if it does, it will have been largely because of the ability to
61
tap the human capital created prior to the fall of the Akaev regime. Civic life in
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is considerably less developed than Kyrgyzstan’s;
should those regimes fall, the Uzbek and Turkmen states are more likely to fail.
The fourth element of U.S. policy must be to discourage Uzbekistan’s desire
for regional hegemony. Since independence, Uzbekistan has generated mistrust
in and poor relations with its neighbors. Its economic policies, border control,
and security policies have worsened the political and economic climate of Central Asia. The challenge for policy, then, is how to encourage the kind of political
and economic reform needed to create a strong and free Uzbekistan without being seen as favoring or promoting Uzbek ambitions.
The fifth element of U.S. policy should be a focus on economic reform and
the alleviation of poverty. Over the last few years most Central Asian states have

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

17

Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 1, Art. 6
108

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

seen double-digit growth in gross domestic product. This is an encouraging
sign, but it hides underlying economic weaknesses. A large segment of the region
is not seeing the benefits of economic growth; 49 percent of the population in
Central Asia lives on less than two dollars a day (see figure 2). Instead, a disproportionate amount of those benefits are being captured by ruling elites and their supporters, producing, as we have seen, corruption, rent seeking, and illegal activity.
Recent initiatives such as the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement are
positive steps, but ways need to be found to raise the standard of living of the aver62
age Central Asian. Corruption prevention, aid, and structural reform measures
must break the pattern of poor economic governance and endemic corruption.
Specific U.S. policy measures that might promote this end are listed in table 2.
How can the United States and the West in general improve economic conditions in remote, landlocked countries with fragmented markets, poor economic
governance, corruption-ridden societies, and uncertain futures? Foreign direct
investment (FDI) in such an environment will be sparse, except in high-payoff
industries like oil and gold extraction. Liberal economic policies, while welcome, would not compensate for the absence of commercial opportunities. The
keys to improving regional economic conditions are market expansion and reintegration, which can hapFIGURE 2
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available at www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/pdfs/table2-5.pdf.
the possibilities there. Accordingly, American economic strategy should aim primarily at increasing
intraregional trade and the institutions that support it (see table 2).
Energy extraction in itself, however, should not be the focus of Washington’s
regional economic engagement strategy. Only three of the states have significant
quantities of oil and gas, of which the economic benefits go largely to the elites.
The only viable exporter of energy over the next ten years will be Kazakhstan.
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TABLE 2
RECOMMENDED POLICY
Economic Measures (aid, trade agreements, loans)

Human Capital and Civil Society Development

• Trade harmonization
• Currency convertibility

• Building of educational infrastructure, including
funding to pay for teachers

• Diversification of trade away from primary
commodities (i.e., gold, oil, gas, cotton)
• Agricultural reform to include:

• Fund translation of English texts into local
languages and make readily available to libraries and
community centers
• Fund independent printing presses

• Improving irrigation infrastructure
• Outreach and other training designed to shift
agricultural production from cotton to less
water-intensive crops
• Tax reform (simplification and enforcement)
designed to move more of the region’s economic
activity from the gray economy into the legal
economy
• Auditing of Central Asian government and
corporate finances by outside agencies (improve
transparency)

• Fund independent news media
• Increase cultural and educational exchanges
(students, lawmakers, military, police, and
businessmen)
• Fund scholarships for up-and-coming leaders to
attend U.S. institutions (Harvard’s Kennedy School
of Governance, etc.)
• Provide access to modern information technology at
the local level (NGOs, schools, community centers).

• Work with Asian Development Bank to provide
micro loans to small and medium-sized businesses
• Fund building of transportation infrastructure.

The American concern with respect to Central Asian oil and gas should not be
more FDI but greater transparency in the management and distribution of profits from Kazakhstan’s energy wealth. “The need for improved transparency applies not only to the government, but also to foreign and domestic oil
63
companies.” Regulation could require American companies to be completely
transparent in their payments to regional states and companies; it should also
urge greater openness in the oversight of the National Fund of the Republic of
64
Kazakhstan (created in August 2000). FDI will naturally flow as soon as the region is seen as a good investment and credit risk—and that can result only from
economic stability and good governance.
The sixth policy recommendation deals with how aid is used in the region. As
we have seen, American aid is fairly small; therefore, it is likely to influence decisions only in areas that regimes consider of low importance. Humanitarian aid
to the sick and poor is one of those areas. Second, since current conditions dilute
aid effectiveness, it should be limited to items that will promote economic and
political reform and the development of a vibrant civil society. To this end, it
should be limited to the modest and patient roles of disseminating ideas, transmitting experiences of other countries, educational and leadership exchanges,
media reform, legal and economic technical assistance for banks and other economic institutions, and projects that support civil society at the grassroots level.
Most importantly, aid projects must be viewed by locals as helping them and not
supporting corrupt governments. Conflict-prevention projects in Uzbekistan
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are a good example; funding Kyrgyzstan’s only independent printing press is
another.
The United States cannot, however, leverage its soft power or effectively deploy its information tools if the region’s leaders and citizens are not persuaded
that the security aspects of American policy cannot be separated from its
nonsecurity aspects. Therefore, human rights and the promotion of human dignity must be given a central role in U.S. policy. Torture in prisons and suppression of political opponents must have costs. The United States may not be able to
effect a complete reversal of the human rights record in the region, but it can
keep the issue visible. Every political dissident freed through U.S. pressure will
be a victory for American soft power and its ideals. Real progress in human
rights and freedom will only occur with internal reform; Washington’s job is to
keep the pressure on and show the people of the region that there are alternatives
to their current situation.
U.S. policy should also promote broad-based reforms; political gradualism
only makes real reform less likely, resulting perhaps in liberal autocracies like
65
those of the Middle East. Liberal autocracies in Central Asia would be no more
likely than those of the Middle East today to be strong states or prevent the propagation of radicalism and other transnational threats. Such a transformation
could make permanent the underlying weaknesses that currently exist. Encouraging broad-based reform risks alienation of elites and even instability. Even so,
short-term political instability and frequent, if peaceful, changes in government
would be better than a collapsed state.
Lastly, success in Afghanistan will enhance Central Asian security more than
anything else American action could achieve. A properly functioning, prosperous Afghanistan will secure the region’s southern border and largely eliminate
the threat posed by transnational threats. Destroying the bulk of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was the first step
in the process. Political and economic stability followed by good governance in
Afghanistan is the next step; because the United States has not been able to
achieve it, Afghanistan still threatens Central Asian security. Notably, the expansion of the opium trade is destabilizing, especially in Tajikistan. It will likely be
many more years before Afghanistan will effectively govern itself and be able to
control its borders. In the meantime, the international community—specifically
NATO, which took over the International Security Assistance Force in that
country in 2003—needs to find a way to secure Afghanistan’s northern border
with Central Asia.
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LIMITED LEVERAGE, LONG-TERM GOALS
Central Asia is a region populated by weak states. This weakness is largely a result of the inability of the region’s governments to deliver political goods equitably and adequately. Endemic corruption, weak civil societies, government
harassment of citizens, subversion of democratic norms, breaches of the rule of
law, severe poverty, and other indicators of state weakness are all present.
The rise of instability and radicalism in Central Asia has largely resulted from
the failure of governance. Military power and foreign aid by outside powers will
not reverse that failure. The United States is limited in its ability to effect change
in the region by geopolitics, the nature of the local regimes, and a lack of leverage. American policy must therefore use what leverage it has more effectively,
through better understanding of the regional dynamics. In general, it should focus on Central Asia as a whole, while realizing that each of its states is different.
Further, the United States should act as a promoter and sponsor of a unified regional cooperative strategy—one that seeks unity among all actors and promotes economic prosperity, regional cooperation, civic life, and good
governance.
Specifically, American Central Asian policy should embrace the seven elements elaborated above. First, Washington needs to develop a unified strategy
that will align all the elements of national power. All U.S. government agencies
should focus on two goals: ensuring that Central Asian states do not fail and improving their ability to deliver political goods to their citizens. Policy and strategy needs to be coordinated not only within the U.S. government but also with
other Western institutions and agencies working in the region. Second, a coordinated strategy should be developed with regional powers, one aimed at a regional cooperative architecture that will ultimately produce an independent
regional multilateral organization. Third, policy should be grounded in the fact
that though all Central Asia states are weak and could fail, their regimes, with the
possible exception of the new Kyrgyz government, are highly resistant to change;
therefore, political instability will likely be one of the only ways to break existing
power structures and generate reform. Western strategy should lay the groundwork for such a possibility, by supporting nonviolent resistance by broadly
based civic coalitions and pressuring governments to expand the political space
for nonviolent civic action. Fourth, Uzbekistan’s aspirations to regional hegemony should be discouraged. Fifth, policy and aid should focus on improving
regional trade and institutions that support it, to foster economic reform and alleviate poverty. Sixth, because U.S. foreign aid devoted to the region is limited, it
needs to concentrate on projects that support long-term objectives that will not
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be seen as directly supporting corrupt regimes or ruling elites. Last, and perhaps
best, to promote stability in Central Asia, the United States and NATO must succeed in Afghanistan.
America’s current Central Asia policy is far from perfect. New and creative
thinking is needed if it is to have a chance of overcoming the challenges it faces.
In particular, American Central Asian policy can succeed only if the tools of policy and the goals are related more closely. There can be no guarantee of success,
but strategic risk can be reduced by a better understanding of U.S. limitations
and a better alignment of ends and means.
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